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Abstract
The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organiza-
tion is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, 
including prevention, detection, and response to potential global health emergen-
cies such as the ongoing covid-19 pandemic. While Article 44 of this binding legal 
instrument  requires countries to collaborate and assist each other in meeting their 
respective obligations, recent events demonstrate that the precise nature and scope 
of these legal obligations are ill-understood. A shared understanding of the level and 
type of collaboration legally required by the ihr is a necessary step in ensuring these 
obligations can be acted upon and fully realized, and in fostering global solidarity 
and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public 
international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning 
of Article 44 using the interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
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1 Introduction
The International Health Regulations (ihr) is a legally binding international 
instrument that governs how 196 states parties collectively promote global 
health security, including preventing, detecting, reporting, and responding to 
infectious disease outbreaks that pose major global threats. Its most recent 
version was adopted unanimously in 2005 by the World Health Assembly un-
der Articles 21(a) and 22 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization 
(who). This revision to the ihr followed the Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (sars) outbreak in 2003 that exposed weaknesses in the ihr’s previous 
version and garnered worldwide support for fundamental changes. The revised 
ihr aims to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health re-
sponse to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate 
with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary inter-
ference with international traffic and trade”.1
When renegotiating the ihr, countries discussed at great lengths how 
this important legal instrument must require countries to support each oth-
er in curtailing the international spread of diseases for everyone’s benefit.2 
 Article 44 of the ihr is the outcome and legal embodiment of this identified 
need: it legally requires collaboration between states parties and from who 
for the fulfillment of the ihr’s other obligations. This need continued to be 
discussed after the ihr’s entry into force in 2007. Most prominently, that 
year who focused its marquee World Health Report 2007 on how the ihr fa-
cilitates collective responses to global health security threats through global 
 partnerships and international collaboration, with the who Director-General 
emphasizing that “[i]nternational public health security is both a collective 
aspiration and a mutual responsibility”.3 Yet, despite the importance of this 
need and its  encapsulation in Article 44 of the ihr, there is little legal guidance 
available to countries to better understand the precise nature and nuances of 
their collaboration obligations. As described in the introduction to this special 
issue of International Organizations Law Review, this article contains the sec-
ond of two consensus statements that apply generally accepted principles and 
doctrine of public international law to interpret countries’ legal obligations 
under the ihr. This second statement clarifies the duties countries have under 
1 International Health Regulations (2005) entered into force June 15, 2007, art. 2 [hereinafter 
ihr (2005)].
2 Who, ‘The World Health Report 2007 A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21St 
Century’ <https://www.who.int/whr/2007/whr07_en.pdf?ua=1> [hereinafter World Health 
Report 2007].
3 Ibid., vii.
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Article 44 of the ihr to collaborate and assist each other in preparing for and 
responding to public health events.
For historical context, the ihr can be traced back to the earlier Interna-
tional Sanitary Conventions adopted between 1892 and 1944, that were brought 
together by the World Health Assembly in 1951 as the International Sanitary 
Regulations, and then revised and renamed in 1969 as the International Health 
Regulations. The ihr (1969) applied only to four diseases: plague, cholera, yel-
low fever and smallpox.4 Additional quarantinable diseases were added in 1973 
and in 1981.5 The Regulations as revised in 2005 (ihr (2005)) represented a 
more “substantial revision”,6 including significant changes to how countries 
were expected to prepare for and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.
In rethinking how the world must respond to disease outbreaks, the ihr 
emphasized the public health rationale of this international legal instrument. 
While public health was certainly important in previous versions, the ihr 
(2005) shifted away from a focus on controlling borders to one where contain-
ing diseases at their source was of paramount concern.7 For example, whereas 
the Foreword to the ihr (1969) noted that its purpose was “to ensure the maxi-
mum security against the international spread of diseases with a minimum 
interference with world traffic”,8 Article 2 of the ihr (2005) emphasizes “a pub-
lic health response” as a central purpose of this international instrument.9 The 
protection of trade and travel remain important goals, but with the ihr (2005), 
the primacy of public health is clear.
In addition to clarifying the purpose and scope of this instrument, the re-
vised ihr introduced a number of novel features that further privilege public 
health. In particular, the instrument’s scope was expanded beyond a specific 
list of diseases through the creation of the more holistic concepts such as “dis-
ease”, “event”, and “public health emergency of international concern” 
(pheic).10 Accompanying the creation of this new concept, the revised ihr 
also established specific procedures for countries to notify who of specific 
events. Using the ihr’s Annex 2 decision instrument, states parties are re-
quired to assess events that may constitute a pheic by focusing on four fac-
tors: the seriousness of the “public health impact of the event”; the nature of 
4 ihr (2005), above n 1, 1.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, 1.
7 Sara E Davies et al., Disease Diplomacy International Norms and Global Health Security 
(2015) [hereinafter Disease Diplomacy].
8 International Health Regulations (1969) entered into force January 1, 1982, 5.
9 ihr (2005), above n 1, art 2.
10 Ibid., art 1, 12. See ihr Article 1 for the full definitions of “disease”, “event”, and “public 
health emergency of international concern”.
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the event (“unusual or unexpected”); the “risk of international spread”; and the 
significance of the “risk of international travel and trade restrictions”.11 The re-
vised ihr give the who Director-General sole authority (albeit taking into 
consideration the advice of an expert group referred to in the Regulations as 
the “Emergency Committee”) to declare a pheic (Article 12) and to issue tem-
porary recommendations that “may include health measures” to achieve the 
purpose and scope of the ihr (Article 15).12
Other features that support the public health goals of this instrument in-
clude: the creation of minimum core public health capacities (Articles 5, 13, 
and Annex 1) (discussed below); the expanded role of non-state actors in as-
sisting with the detection of serious events by providing who with unofficial 
reports of public health events (Article 9); and the role of scientific evidence in 
decision-making processes (Article 12 for the pheic declaration, Article 17 for 
criteria for recommendations, Article 43 for additional health measures).
Having been absent in previous versions of the ihr, human rights also have 
a strong textual foundation in the revised ihr (2005), both as a protection for 
persons and travellers against measures that unnecessarily interfere with their 
liberties and as a fundamental principle for interpreting and implementing 
every aspect of this instrument, notably the universal right to health.13 Couched 
in mandatory language, Article 3 introduces the principles that must guide the 
implementation of the ihr, which “shall be with full respect for dignity, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms of persons” (Article 3.1) and “shall be 
guided by the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of the World 
Health Organization” as authoritative documents to provide further imple-
mentation guidance (Article 3.2).
The reference to the UN Charter and who’s Constitution provides key in-
sights into how the ihr should be legally interpreted. Article 55 of the UN 
Charter requires the promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”, while the Constitution of the 
who recognizes “[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” 
as a fundamental right.14 In referring to these two texts, the ihr clarifies that 
human rights must be applied in the context of infectious disease control. By 
becoming a fundamental principle of the ihr, human rights became a tool to 
11 Ibid, Annex 2.
12 Ibid, art 12, 15.
13 Ibid, 1, art 3, 32.
14 Constitution of the World Health Organization, open for signature 22 July 1946, 14 unts 185, 
(entered into force 17 November 1947) art 2(a) [who Constitution]. See Lawrence O Gos-
tin, Benjamin M Meier, Rebekah Thomas, Veronica Magar, Tedros A Ghebreyesus, ‘70 Years 
of Human Rights in Global Health: Drawing on a Contentious Past to Secure a Hopeful 
Future’ (2018) The Lancet 2731–2735 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(18)32997-0>.
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ensure effective pandemic preparedness and an interpretive aid in guiding the 
ihr’s implementation.
National core public health capacities were also introduced in the ihr to 
strengthen countries’ abilities to prevent, protect, control, and rapidly respond 
to potential health emergencies. Specifically, obligations were created for states 
parties to develop certain minimum core public health capacities within spe-
cific time frames, as articulated in Article 5, Article 13, and Annex 1.15 These core 
capacities, which did not exist in previous versions of the ihr, represent “an ‘up-
stream’ public health strategy to prevent and contain outbreaks at their source” 
and serve as a complement to the reaction-oriented procedures of the ihr.16
As noted earlier, a final fundamental addition to the ihr (2005) is Article 44 
titled “Collaboration and Assistance” (Box 1). This article was introduced to 
create separate obligations on states parties to “undertake to collaborate with 
each other” and on who to “collaborate with States Parties”, each “to the extent 
possible”, on technical, logistical, financial, and legal aspects to ensure the suc-
cess of the Regulations.17 Not only was collaboration not specifically required 
in earlier versions of the ihr, Article 44 was also absent in the first draft of the 
revised ihr circulated by the Intergovernmental Working Group (igwg) that 
negotiated the revised text to regional and sub-regional country groups.18 It 
was introduced in the second draft of the revised ihr as a direct response to 
many countries’ concerns about the feasibility of implementing core public 
health capacity requirements envisioned in the revised ihr without collabora-
tion from other countries.19 (The details surrounding the addition of this arti-
cle are further explored in Section 3.2)
The challenge is that, despite its inclusion in the legally binding ihr, most 
countries have not collaborated to the extent necessary, in particular, for 
achieving the minimum core public health capacities in every country.
Given this context, it is essential to bring clarity to the international legal ob-
ligations of states parties and who to collaborate and assist under  Article 44 of 
the ihr. While certain elements of Article 44 are evident, there remain ambi-
guities within the article that have caused confusion and require  clarification. 
15 ihr (2005), above n 1, arts 5, 13, Annex 1.
16 Lawrence O Gostin & Rebecca Katz, ‘The International Health Regulations: The Govern-
ing Framework for Global Health Security’ (2016) 94 The Milbank Quarterly 270 [hereinaf-
ter The Governing Framework for Global Health Security].
17 ihr (2005), above n 1, art 44.
18 International Health Regulations Working Paper for Regional Consultation, Intergovern-
mental Working Group on Revision of the International Health Regulations, Doc igwg/ihr/
Working paper/12.2003 (2004).
19 Review and approval of proposed amendments to the International Health Regulations: 
Draft Revision, Intergovernmental Working Group on Revision of the International Health 
Regulations, 11, Doc A/ihr/igwg/3 (2004).
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A shared understanding of what level and type of collaboration and assistance 
are legally required by the ihr is a necessary step in ensuring these obligations 
can be acted upon and fully realized. Without such clarity, it may be impos-
sible for countries to know their exact obligations and to hold each other ac-
countable for fulfilling them, thus undermining the public health purposes of 
the ihr.
To provide this clarity, public international law scholars specializing in glob-
al health were systematically identified and convened to collectively apply the 
interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties to the ihr, 
to reach a jurisprudential consensus on the legal meaning of obligations under 
Article 44, and author this consensus statement.20 Twenty scholars were found 
to meet the following five criteria and were invited to a consensus conference: 
1) public international law scholar; 2) qualified as a lawyer or appointed as a 
full-time core faculty at a law school; 3) focus at least half of one’s scholarly 
activities on global health; 4) author of relevant peer-reviewed articles pub-
lished within the last five years; and 5) independent of other scholars, supervi-
sors, governments, and other directive entities. Fourteen scholars participated 
in the conference, held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, April 8–10, 2019, funded 
by research grants from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the 
Research Council of Norway. This “Stellenbosch Consensus” statement details 
the participating group’s methodology and legal interpretation of Article 44 of 
the ihr. Some members of the expert group urged going further by specifying 
specific kinds and levels of transnational capacity building to fulfill their ihr 
legal obligations. Since no consensus could be reached on greater specificity, it 
does not appear in this collective statement.
2 Methodology
2.1 Preliminary comments
To clarify the obligations of collaboration created under Article 44 of the ihr, 
this analysis uses the rules of interpretation established in Articles 31 and 32 
20 The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines “jurisprudence” as: “[t]he theoretical analysis of 
legal issues at the highest level of abstraction. Jurisprudence may be distinguished from 
both legal theory and the philosophy of law by its concern with those questions (e.g. 
about the nature of a particular right or duty, or a particular line of judicial reasoning) 
that arise within or are implied by substantive legal disciplines.” See Jonathan Law, The 
Oxford Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2nd ed, 2018) sub verbo 
“jurisprudence”.
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of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).21 
Although the rules of the Vienna Convention do not represent an exhaustive 
compilation of guidance on the interpretation of international agreements, 
they are widely regarded as having general applicability to the interpretation 
of  international legal instruments as an expression of accepted principles and 
practices, including instruments like the ihr that were concluded under the 
21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 unts 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980).[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Box 1 Article 44 of the ihr (2005)
Article 44 Collaboration and assistance
1. States Parties shall undertake to collaborate with each other, to the 
extent possible, in:
a) the detection and assessment of and response to events as 
provided under these Regulations;
b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and lo-
gistical support particularly in the development, strengthen-
ing and maintenance of the public health capacities required 
under these Regulations;
c) the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate implemen-
tation of their obligations under these Regulations; and
d) the formulation of proposed laws and other legal and ad-
ministrative provisions for the implementation of these 
Regulations.
2. who shall collaborate with States Parties, upon request, to the ex-
tent possible, in:
a) the evaluation and assessment of their public health capaci-
ties in order to facilitate the effective implementation of these 
Regulations;
b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and lo-
gistical support to States Parties; and
c) the mobilization of financial resources to support developing 
countries in building strengthening and maintaining the ca-
pacities provided for in Annex 1.
3. Collaboration under this Article may be implemented through mul-
tiple channels, including bilaterally, through regional networks and 
the who regional offices and, through intergovernmental organiza-
tions and international bodies.
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auspices of an international organization.22 Support for this latter conclu-
sion can be found under Article 5 of the Vienna Convention which stipulates 
that “the Convention applies…to any treaty adopted within an international 
organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization”.23 
While the ihr is not referred to as a “treaty” by who or its parties, the Vienna 
Convention was nonetheless applied here because it is the most authoritative 
framework for interpreting all types of written international law instruments 
no matter their name or label.
Regulations adopted under Article 21 of the who Constitution become le-
gally binding on all who member states unless a state expresses its wish to be 
exempt within 18 months from the date of notification.24 Since no state party 
had sought to opt out of the revised ihr before its entry into force, the ihr is 
binding on all these states, with two additional states, the Holy See and Liech-
tenstein, acceding subsequently.
The degree to which states understood the ihr to create reciprocal legal 
obligations subject to the Vienna Convention is further illustrated by the re-
sponses that emerged from reservations to the regulations. For example, speak-
ing on behalf of 27 member states, Portugal, as then-President of the Council 
of the European Union, recalled the principle set out in Article 27 of the Vien-
na Convention that “a Party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform its international obligations” and con-
cluded that federal governments would be expected to “exercise every effort to 
ensure that the provisions of the ihr are fully implemented and given full ef-
fect by the pertinent authorities”.25
2.2 Interpretative approach: Framework
The UN International Law Commission (ilc) has previously advised that the 
interpretation of a treaty should consist of “a single combined operation, which 
places appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, 
respectively, in articles 31 [general rule of interpretation] and 32 [supplemen-
tary means of interpretation]” (emphasis added) of the Vienna Convention.26 
Guided by the authority of the ilc, the analysis in this article uses the means 
22 Richard K Gardiner, A Single Set of Rules (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2nd ed, 
2015).
23 ihr (2005),above n 1, art 5.
24 who Constitution, above n 14, art 22.; ihr, above n1, art 59(1).
25 ihr (2005), aboven 1, appendix 2.
26 International Law Commission, Chapter vi Subsequent agreements and subsequent prac-
tice in relation to the interpretation of treaties (New York: United Nations, 7th session, 2018) 
11 at 13 [hereinafter 2018 ilc Report].
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of interpretation found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. The fol-
lowing section outlines the different aspects of Articles 31 and 32, emphasizing 
which means of interpretation are most helpful for the understanding of the 
ihr’s Article 44.
2.2.1 General rule of interpretation: Ordinary meaning
As a starting point, Articles 31.1 of the Vienna Convention requires a “good faith” 
interpretation of the “ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty” with-
in the “context” and in light of the treaty’s “object and purpose”.27 The context 
and object and purpose are necessary to understanding an ordinary meaning 
and should not be considered as “additional or optional elements” when un-
dertaking an interpretation under Article 31.1.28
With regard to the “context” necessary for an ordinary meaning interpreta-
tion under Article 31.1, Article 31.2 clarifies that this refers to the “text, including 
its preamble and annexes”, as well as other agreements “made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty”, or other instruments 
“made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of treaty 
and  accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty”.29  
The analysis that follows relies only on the whole text (including the preamble 
and annexes), as there are no additional relevant agreements or other instru-
ments made in connection to the conclusion of the ihr (2005) that aid in in-
terpreting Article 44.
2.2.2 General rule of interpretation: Subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice
Article 31.3 establishes further tools to use under the general rule of interpreta-
tion: subsequent agreements and subsequent practice. The first – “(a) subse-
quent agreements between the parties regarding the interpretation or applica-
tion of the treaty and its provisions”30 – does not apply as none have been 
made in connection with Article 44 of the ihr.
The second – (b) “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes agreement on its interpretation”31 – is of limited applicability in 
the case of interpreting Article 44. In order to determine whether a state’s 
 action qualifies as “practice” under the Vienna Convention, the threshold test 
27 Vienna Convention, above n 21, art 31.1.
28 Richard K Gardiner, The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, UK, 2nd ed, 2015) 482 [hereinafter Treaty Interpretation].
29 Vienna Convention, above n 21, art 31.2.
30 Ibid, art 31.3(a).
31 Ibid, art 31.3(b).
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requires establishing that the practice reflects an agreement of the parties 
that has been carried out “systematically or repeatedly in implementation and 
application of a treaty”.32 The ilc Draft conclusions on subsequent agreement 
and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties affirms that 
subsequent practice is “an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, 
paragraph 3(b)” and that it “consists of conduct in the application of a treaty, 
after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing the interpretation of the treaty”.33 The ilc report also specifies that “the 
weight of a subsequent agreement or practice as a means of interpretation 
under article 31, paragraph 3, depends, inter alia, on its clarity and specificity” 
and that the weight of a subsequent practice depends on “whether and how it 
is repeated”.34
This threshold for the application of subsequent practice to aid in the in-
terpretation of a treaty is very high.35 The authors agreed that, for the pur-
poses of understanding Article 44 of the ihr, there is no state practice that 
meets the Vienna Convention’s Article 31.3 requirements. Instead, Section 4 
presents “state action” as empirical observations of what practically occurs 
in terms of collaboration for global health security. Although not an authori-
tative interpretative tool under the Vienna Convention, these practices could 
provide initial evidence of what action could qualify as collaboration under 
Article 44.
2.2.3 General rule of interpretation: Relevant and applicable rules of 
international law
The third, yet equally important, element to be taken into account under 
 Article 31.3(c) calls for consideration of “any rules of international law appli-
cable to the relations between parties”.36 In other words, the provision refers to 
the principle of systemic integration, “whereby international obligations are 
32 Richard Gardiner, ‘The General Rule: (2) Agreements as Context, Subsequent Agreements, 
and Subsequent Practice’ in Treaty Interpretation, (Oxford University Press,  Oxford, UK, 
2nd ed, 2015) 254.
33 ilc Draft conclusions on subsequent agreement and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties.
34 International Law Commission, ‘Chapter vi Subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties’ in Report on the Work of the Seventieth 
Session Doc. A/cn.4/L.917 + Add.1 (New York: United Nations, 2018) 11 at 70.
35 International Law Commission, ‘Chapter iv Subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties in Report on the Work of the Sixty-fifth 
Session A/cn.4/L.819 + Add.1–3 (New York: United Nations, 2013) 11 at 30.
36 Vienna Convention ,aboven 21,art 31.3(c).
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interpreted by reference to their normative environment”.37 As expressed by 
the International Law Commission’s Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
 International Law, Article 31(3)(c) requires “the integration into the process 
of legal reasoning – including reasoning by courts and tribunals – of a sense of 
coherence and meaningfulness”.38
According to international legal scholars, the terms of this clause opera-
tionally allow for obligations emerging from other binding international le-
gal agreements which apply to the parties of a treaty under interpretation to 
be considered as part of the “relevant rules of international law applicable to 
the relations between parties”.39 The icj confirmed this approach in Djibouti 
v France (2008), a case in which Djibouti successfully supported its claim 
that France had violated its obligations for mutual assistance under the 1986 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters by referring to a 1977 
bilateral treaty which required the two countries to found their relations on 
equality, mutual respect, and peace.40
This interpretative tool is primarily used in Section 3.2.2 of this analysis, 
which examines the normative environment surrounding the ihr with respect 
to international human rights law in order to provide one explanation for the 
centrality of core capacities within an interpretation of Article 44.
2.2.4 General rule of interpretation: special meaning
The last general rule of interpretation (Article 31.4) is that “special meaning 
shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended”.41 While 
Article 1 of the ihr lays out specific definitions necessary for understanding 
this instrument, none are specific to, or aid in the interpretation of Article 44. 
This analysis therefore does not rely on Article 31.4 of the Vienna Convention.
2.2.5 Supplementary means of interpretation
Lastly, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention dictates that “[r]ecourse may be 
had to supplementary means of interpretation” for two different purposes.42 
37 unga, International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, 58th Sess, UN Doc A/cn.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) [413] [ilc Study on the Frag-
mentation of International Law].
38 Ibid, [419].
39 Richard K Gardiner, The General Rule: (3) Relevant Rules of International Law and Special 
Meanings (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2nd ed, 2015) 301.
40 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), ( Judg-
ment), [2008] icj Rep 177, 219.
41 Vienna Convention above n 21, art 31.4.
42 Ibid, art 32.
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 Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation may be made to confirm 
the meaning determined through the application of the general rule of inter-
pretation in Article 31.43 Supplementary means may also be used to determine 
the meaning where the general rule of interpretation leaves the meaning ei-
ther ambiguous or obscure, or would otherwise lead to manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable interpretation.44 Supplementary means, which include the 
treaty’s preparatory work, are rarely determinative and are more commonly 
deployed to support interpretations achieved under Article 31.45
Supplementary means of interpretation are used throughout this analysis 
of Article 44 to confirm the interpretation reached by the ordinary meaning 
within the context of the ihr, and in light of the ihr’s object and purpose. This 
analysis utilizes summary documentation related to the travaux préparatoires – 
including Secretariat reports, igwg documents, and regional reports made 
publicly available by who – as supplementary means of interpretation.
3 Interpreting Article 44
Recognizing the importance of interpreting Article 44 of the ihr (2005), 
the following section uses the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention to determine the ordinary meaning, while support-
ing the  ordinary meaning with the context, and object and purpose in a “single 
combined operation”.46 Where appropriate, recourse is made to supplemen-
tary means, as defined by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, to confirm an 
interpretation reached under the general rule.
3.1 Obligations
Article 44 creates a legally binding duty on states parties and who: 1) states 
parties “shall undertake to collaborate”; and 2) who “shall collaborate”.47 The 
use of this imperative verb “shall”, rather than weaker language such as “should”, 
indicates the existence of a legal obligation. The decision to include imperative 




45 Treaty Interpretation, above n 28, 489.
46 Vienna Convention above n 21, art 31; 2018 ilc Report, above n 26, 13.
47 ihr (2005) ,above n 1, art 44.
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“Collaboration” is defined as “a cooperative agreement of two or more parties 
to work jointly towards a common goal”.48 Interestingly, while the title of Article 
44 encompasses the two concepts of “collaboration” and “assistance”, the arti-
cle itself only outlines the various ways states parties and who can collaborate 
and does not refer to “assistance” when elaborating on the duties. The absence 
of “assistance” within the body of the article indicates that Article 44 is primar-
ily about how states parties and who can work jointly to achieve ihr’s goals 
through collaboration. The analysis that follows will therefore only refer to ob-
ligations of “collaboration”.
A granular examination of Article 44.1 (states parties) and Article 44.2 
(who) provides insight into the obligations that can be gleaned from an inter-
pretation of this article. In doing so, it also becomes evident what aspects of 
collaboration cannot be determined based on a Vienna Convention interpreta-
tion of this article.
3.1.1 Article 44.1: States parties
States parties are the first duty-bearers under Article 44.1, which dictates that 
states parties “shall undertake to collaborate with each other, to the extent 
possible”.49 Article 44 applies to all states parties to the ihr, as none made 
 successful reservations specifically with respect to this article.50 The following 
textual analysis reveals that Article 44.1 creates a common and shared respon-
sibility among all states parties to collaborate towards the achievement of four 
key areas, with a particular focus on the core public health capacities identi-
fied in the ihr, and that, although Article 44.1 does not specify how states 
 parties can implement their individual obligations, there are clearly different 
levels and types of collaboration expected from different countries.
Before delving into the various ways states parties can collaborate with each 
other, it is useful to articulate that collaboration under Article 44 does not dis-
place individual state obligations under the ihr but instead must be read as a 
supplement to these individual obligations. The ihr creates many immediate 
duties that each country must achieve in order to fulfill all their obligations. 
For example, Article 5.1 dictates that states parties “shall develop, strengthen, 
and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years from the entry 
into force […] the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events”.51 Article 
48 Black’s Law Dictionary, Definition of Collaboration (March 17, 2018) <https://thelaw 
dictionary.org/collaboration/>.
49 ihr (2005),above n 1, art 44.1.
50 who, States Parties to the International Health Regulations (2005) (November 16, 2018) 
<http://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/>.
51 ihr (2005), above n 1, art 5.1.
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13.1 creates similar obligations on states parties to develop “the capacity to re-
spond promptly and effectively” to pheics.52 While Article 44.1 places obliga-
tions on states parties to collaborate with other states parties, an understand-
ing of the ihr as a whole confirms that states must first mobilize their own 
resources to meet their obligations. The presence of Article 44 does not excuse 
inaction on the part of individual countries, but instead must be read in light 
of all obligations placed on individual states in the ihr.
Article 44.1 lists four possible areas for state parties to collaborate in fulfill-
ment of their collaboration obligations. First, states parties must undertake 
to collaborate in the detection, assessment of, and response to events (Article 
44.1(a)). Second, collaboration must occur in the provision of technical coop-
eration, logistical support, and the mobilization of financial resources, with 
a specific mandate for “the development, strengthening and maintenance 
of the public health capacities required under these Regulations” (Article 
44.1(b).53 Third, states parties are charged with a general duty to mobilize 
 financial resources “to facilitate implementation of their obligations under 
these Regulations” (Article 44.1(c)).54 Fourth, states parties must undertake 
to collaborate in formulating laws and other legal and administrative provi-
sions (Article 44.1(d)).55 Examples of each of these elements are explored in 
Section 4.
Despite the fact that all states have a common and shared responsibility to 
collaborate, Article 44 provides flexibility as to how its obligations can be ful-
filled. Specifically, the language and structure of Article 44 acknowledges the 
possibility of differentiated duties among states depending on experience and 
resources. The clause “to the extent possible”, followed by a list of four areas 
requiring attention, indicates that different states parties are expected to fulfill 
their obligations in varying ways. States parties with one or more of the four 
capabilities listed in Article 44.1 – technical, logistical, financial, and/or legal or 
administrative – will collaborate depending on what their capacities allow 
them to contribute towards achieving the ihr’s goals. Section 3.3 explores the 
possible limits to this flexibility.
There was, however, no consensus among the authors on whether Article 44 
mandates how countries should implement their individual obligations pursu-
ant to the common and shared responsibility. Article 44.1 indicates that duties 
of collaboration will not necessarily be fulfilled in the same manner by each 
52 Ibid, art 13.1.
53 Ibid, art 44.
54 Ibid, art 44.1.
55 Ibid.
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country but does not provide information on how exactly a specific state party 
will determine its individual duty.
3.1.2 Article 44.2: who
Article 44.2 outlines the obligations required by who, which “shall collaborate 
with States Parties, upon request, to the extent possible”.56 Despite the differ-
ences in the obligations of states parties to “undertake to collaborate” and 
who to simply “collaborate”, there is overlap between both duty-bearers’ sub-
stantive obligations.
who must collaborate in the evaluation and assessment of countries’ pub-
lic health capacities (Article 44.2(a)), on the “provision or facilitation of tech-
nical cooperation and logistical support to states parties” (Article 44.2(b)), and 
mobilizing financial resources “to support developing countries in building, 
strengthening and maintaining the capacities provided in Annex 1” (Article 
44.2(c)). With regard to financial mobilization, who has a narrower duty to 
specifically work with developing countries in creating core public health ca-
pacities for surveillance and response (Annex 1A) and for designated airports, 
ports, and ground crossings (Annex 1B).
who’s responsibilities to collaborate are further specified within the broad-
er context of the ihr. Articles 5 and 13 on core capacities for surveillance and 
for public health responses reiterate who’s duties to “assist States Parties upon 
request, to develop, strengthen and maintain the capacities referred to in para-
graph 1 of this Article” (Article 5.3). Articles 5 and 13 also state who’s duties to 
“collaborate in the response to public health risks and other events by provid-
ing technical guidance and assistance and by assessing the effectiveness of the 
control measures in place, including the mobilization of international teams 
of experts for on-site assistance, when necessary” (Article 13.3). Articles 5, 13, 
and 44 all require collaboration from who.
Article 44.2 also dictates that who’s duty to collaborate is triggered “upon 
request” by states parties to the organization. This clause was added to the final 
version of the ihr, likely in response to countries’ concerns raised in the re-
gional consultations over the need to balance sovereignty of states parties and 
who’s mandate under the ihr.57 Interestingly, the French, Spanish, and 
 Chinese versions – equally as authoritative as the English version – do not in-
clude this clause.
The limits imposed by “to the extent possible” are explored in Section 3.3.
56 Ibid, art 44.2.
57 Summary Report of Regional Consultations, Intergovernmental Working Group on Revision 
of the International Health Regulations, Doc A/ihr/igwg/2 (2004) ¶ 8, 12, [hereinafter 
Summary Regional Consultations].
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3.1.3 Article 44.3: Implementation of the obligation to collaborate
Article 44.3 gives states parties and who flexibility on the mechanisms for dis-
charging their duties under Article 44. Collaboration “may be implemented” 
using bilateral or regional networks, who regional or country offices, or inter-
governmental organizations and international bodies.58 The use of “may” indi-
cates that states parties and who have the discretion, but are not obligated, to 
use these channels to fulfil their respective obligations under Article 44.1 and 
44.2. Although states parties and who may collaborate through these chan-
nels, the legal duty required by Article 44 remains on each state party to engage 
with each other and with third parties.
The context of the ihr as a whole, and in light of the constitutional func-
tions of the organization listed in Article 2 of the who Constitution, the ihr 
places greater expectations on who to collaborate with third parties. Article 14 
creates a legally binding obligation on who whereby who “shall cooperate 
and coordinate its activities, as appropriate with other competent intergovern-
mental organizations or international bodies in the implementation of these 
Regulations […]”.59 Resolution wha 58.3 of the World Health Assembly – 
who’s plenary governing body which adopted the ihr in 2005 pursuant to the 
organization’s constitution – includes a list of eleven organizations and bodies 
with which who is expected to collaborate to fulfill its duties under Article 14 
of the ihr (2005).60 The resolution requests that the who Director-General 
work with these organizations to achieve the ihr’s goals.61
3.2 Centrality of core capacities
Although the scope of collaboration in Article 44 is intended to target multiple 
aspects of the ihr, the core public health capacities required of each country 
by Articles 5, 13, and Annex 1 represent a priority area for collaboration. There 
are two main rationales for linking the minimum obligations required by 
 Article 44 to the public health capacities listed within the text of the ihr: a 
public health rationale, and a human rights rationale. While neither rationale 
is definitive on its own, they each provide an understanding for why core 
58 ihr (2005),above n 1, art 44.3.
59 Ibid, art 14.
60 The listed organization are: United Nations, International Labour Organization, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Committee of the 
Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Interna-
tional Air Transport Association, International Shipping Federation, and Office Interna-
tional des Epizooties, Also see above n 1, 4.
61 ihr (2005), above n 1, 4.
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 capacities are important not only for the realization of Article 44, but for ihr 
obligations as a whole.
3.2.1 Public health rationale
Core capacities hold a central role in the ihr’s public health response and are 
therefore a key target for collaboration under Article 44. The importance of the 
core capacities is principally highlighted in Part ii of the ihr (“Information 
and Public Health Response”) in conjunction with Annex 1, which outlines the 
capacities necessary for surveillance (Article 5) and for responding to pheics 
(Article 13).62 Annex 1 outlines the minimum core public health capacities re-
quired at the local/primary level, the intermediate level (regional or provin-
cial), and at the national level, which include laboratories, human resources, 
surveillance, preparedness, response, risk communication, coordination, des-
ignation of a National ihr Focal Point, legislation, policy, and financing.63 All 
these capacities are necessary to achieve the ihr’s overall public health goals 
of preventing, protecting against, and controlling the international spread of 
infectious diseases.
Described as “an indisputable baseline for global health security”,64 the core 
public health capacities are also necessary to achieve other key obligations re-
quired by both states parties and who under the ihr. From the perspective of 
states parties, core capacities are required to discharge duties of surveillance 
(Article 5), notification to who within 24 hours of assessment of a public 
health event (Article 6), information-sharing of unexpected or unusual events 
(Article 7), information-sharing to who within 24 hours of receipt of evidence 
of public health risks identified outside a country’s territory (Article 9.2), and 
of verification and provision of information to who in relation to “other sourc-
es” (Article 10.2).65 Further, without a surveillance system capable of detecting 
events, states parties will be unable to use the Annex 2 Decision Instrument to 
make a proper determination of when an event should be notified to who.66
Strong core public health capacities within every state party are also neces-
sary for who to fulfill its obligations. For example, without the timely detec-
tion and receipt of information, who will struggle to provide states parties 
and appropriate intergovernmental organizations the public health informa-
tion “necessary to enable States Parties to respond to a public health risk” 
62 Ibid, art 5, 13, Annex 1.
63 Ibid, Annex 1; The Governing Framework for Global Health Security, above n 16, 269.
64 The Governing Framework for Global Health Security, above n 16, 276.
65 ihr (2005), above n 1.
66 Ibid, Annex 2.
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(Article 11.1).67 Most importantly, without states parties’ capabilities to provide 
who with accurate and timely information, who’s Director-General will be 
severely handicapped in making pheic determinations (Article 12).
The importance of the core capacities is also highlighted by the time-bound 
nature of these obligations and by the assessment requirements imposed on 
states parties. Article 5 (surveillance) and Article 13 (public health response) 
both require that the capacities be achieved “as soon as possible but no later 
than five years from the entry into force” of the ihr.68 States parties were 
equally required to, within two years of the ihr’s entry into force, assess “the 
ability of existing national structures and resources to meet the minimum re-
quirements described in this Annex”.69 Creating a time-limit for these ele-
ments of the ihr underscores an understanding that core capacities were criti-
cal to the achievement of the revised ihr’s purpose of preventing, protecting 
against, controlling, and providing a public health response to the internation-
al spread of disease (Article 2).
The above textual interpretation is supported by recourse to supplementary 
documentation. The who Secretariat’s supplementary documents on the 
drafting history of the ihr confirm this understanding that core capacities are 
central to the public health goals of the ihr and therefore also to an interpreta-
tion of Article 44. Not only was there widespread support for the “overall direc-
tion and approach of the proposals for the revision”, which would help with 
“detection of threats to international public health, response and management 
of these threats to international public health, and communications among 
national institutions and between Member States and the Secretariat”,70 but 
many understood that existing capacities would need to be strengthened “in 
order to implement fully and successfully the revised Regulations”.71
While the full challenge of implementing ihr obligations may have origi-
nally been underestimated, many states parties flagged during the initial con-
sultation process, that compliance with some of the resource-intensive obliga-
tions (i.e., the core capacities) would be problematic and would therefore 
hamper their ability to fulfill obligations created in the ihr. To respond to the 
concerns about the feasibility of compliance, the who Secretariat suggested 
adding Article 44 to the second revised draft (September 2004).72 The who 
67 Ibid, Annex 2, art 11.1.
68 Ibid, Annex 2, art 5, 13.
69 Ibid, Annex 1.
70 Summary Regional Consultations, above n 57, 4.
71 Ibid [5].
72 Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: 
Draft Revision, Intergovernmental Working Group on Revision of the International Health 
Regulations, Doc A/ihr/igwg/3 (2004).
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Secretariat indicated in an explanatory note that this article was “in response 
to several comments requesting that the draft revision should clearly provide 
the possibility for state parties to collaborate with each other in a number of 
areas related to the implementation of the Regulations” (Article 44.1) and 
“introduced to specify who’s commitment to collaborate with States Parties in 
the implementation of the Regulations” (Article 44.2).73 Although not deter-
minative, these supplementary documentations indicate that Article 44 was 
intimately linked to core capacities, and helps support a textual interpretation 
of the importance of core capacities to support the public health goals of the 
ihr.
Without core capacities, states parties and who require more time to detect 
and respond to an event, leading to more lives lost and ultimately preventing 
the world from achieving the public health objective and purpose of the ihr.74 
Public health is therefore the first rationale for the primacy of core capacities.
3.2.2 Human rights rationale
The centrality of core capacities is also supported by the existence of human 
rights obligations. Using the systemic integration method found in Article 
31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention, the ihr can be linked to similar obligations 
found within the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (icescr). Specifically, similar to Article 44 of the ihr, Article 2.1 of the 
icescr requires that international assistance and co-operation form part of 
how rights within the treaty are realized. The ihr can also be linked to Article 
12.2(c) of the icescr, which creates obligations for the control of infectious 
diseases. There is synergy not only between the icescr and the ihr as a whole 
but, taken together, these obligations under the ihr and icescr provide a fur-
ther rationale for the primacy of the core capacities when deciphering the 
scope of collaboration under Article 44 of the ihr.
Although only one component of the commitments made by states parties 
to the full realization of the right to health, Article 12.2(c) of the icescr estab-
lishes that realizing the right to health requires that steps be taken for “the pre-
vention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases”.75 Commitments to this element of the right to health are  further 
73 Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: 
Explanatory Notes, Intergovernmental Working Group on Revision of the International 
Health Regulations, Doc A/ihr/igwg/4 (2004).
74 The Governing Framework for Global Health Security, above n 16, 276.
75 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 unts 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
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elaborated on in General Comment No. 14 adopted by the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which establishes that, under the right 
to health’s core obligations, “measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic 
and endemic diseases” are considered “obligations of comparable priority” to 
the core obligations identified by the Committee.76 General Comment No.14 
also outlines what the fulfillment of this subsection of the right entails: dis-
ease control under Article 12.2(c) includes efforts to “make available relevant 
technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data col-
lection on a disaggregated basis, the implementation or enhancement of im-
munization programmes and other strategies of infectious disease control”.77
The ihr, an instrument focused on the prevention and control of the inter-
national spread of diseases and guided by human rights principles, provides an 
avenue through which countries can fulfill part of their obligations to progres-
sively realize the right to health under the icescr and related human rights 
instruments. The obligations for disease control created under the icescr, 
coupled with details in General Comment No. 14 on what achievement would 
entail, mirror the ihr core capacities required by Articles 5, 13, and Annex 1.78 
Even though the ihr only targets one aspect of the right to health under Arti-
cle 12, the commitments made by states parties under the ihr are essential to 
the realisation of a key part of the right to health for individuals within their 
borders and in other countries, as enumerated in treaty text and elaborated in 
authoritative interpretation. Although the core capacities are only one aspect 
for the proper implementation of the ihr as a whole, they are in alignment 
with states parties’ existing obligations under the icescr. Core capacities un-
der the ihr are essential to not only achieve the ihr’s public health goals, but 
to also achieve part of the right to health under the icescr.
3.3 Flexibilities and limitations on flexibilities
As noted above, Article 44 creates an obligation for shared responsibility of 
collaboration to achieve the goals of the ihr. The clause “to the extent possi-
ble” however, introduced the idea that there are limitations to this obligation. 
While “to the extent possible” can be interpreted as providing flexibility and 
leeway on the level, type, and scope of collaboration that must be undertaken, 
a strict legal interpretation does not reveal the exact extent and meaning of 
76 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc E/C.12/2000/4 
(August 11, 2000) [40]. [hereinafter General Comment 14].
77 Ibid, [16].
78 ihr, above n 1, art 5, 13, Annex 1; icescr, aboven 76, art 12; General Comment 14, above n 
77, [16], 44.
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these limitations. It was agreed that the clause does not create an unlimited 
discretion for states parties and who to determine the nature of their obliga-
tions. While the concise phrasing of Article 44 prevents an exact interpretation 
of these flexibility’s limitations, there are certain limitations that can be inter-
preted from the context, and object and purpose, and supported by supple-
mentary means of interpretation.
Although “to the extent possible” introduces flexibility into Article 44, it 
must be read within the context of the obligation created by “shall”. Other lan-
guage could have been used to indicate greater discretion: “should” or “may” 
could have been used to indicate authoritative albeit non-binding advice; 
“may” could have been used to allow for a discretionary provision. The lan-
guage of Article 44 supports an understanding that every state is bound by the 
mandatory obligations to achieve at least a certain level of collaboration nec-
essary to achieve the object and purpose of the ihr.
As noted above, the ihr is primarily a public health instrument with a focus 
on the prevention, protection against, and control of the international spread 
of disease.79 Given the transboundary nature of infectious and other diseases, 
the safety of individuals around the world requires a certain level of coopera-
tion among states because, when faced with a disease outbreak, in particular a 
pheic, the world may only be as strong as its weakest link. The world is more 
vulnerable when some states parties are not able to fully implement the ihr. 
Even if a country has achieved all of the core public health capacities identi-
fied in the ihr, it will still be vulnerable if neighbouring or travel-hub coun-
tries do not have sufficient capacities to detect and contain a potential out-
break. Given the importance of the legally binding ihr for global health 
security, it would be unreasonable if perhaps the most critical component of 
this instrument (i.e. the core capacities) was undermined by the fact that some 
countries could not meet their obligations and other countries did not have an 
obligation to collaborate with them in achieving these obligations. The public 
health purpose of the ihr therefore requires that the limitations imposed by 
“to the extent possible” are not unlimited. Indeed, the spirit of the regulations 
could be understood to require a more robust cross-national collaboration and 
capacity building.
This interpretation that the ihr’s collaboration obligations cannot be com-
pletely discretionary is supported by supplementary means of interpretation. 
While not determinative alone for an interpretation of the limitation, the pre-
paratory work makes clear that Article 44 was intended to create at least a 
79 ihr, above n 1, art 2.
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meaningful level of cooperation among states in order to ensure that imple-
menting the ihr, and the core capacities in particular, was feasible.
Article 44 and its preparatory materials therefore confirm an interpretation 
that “to the extent possible” does not create an unlimited flexibility. While this 
ordinary meaning interpretation, confirmed by the supplementary means of 
interpretation, does not allow us to decipher the exact limits of this flexibility, 
Part iv provides examples of this flexibility that may begin to provide some 
sense of these limits.
4 Examples of Collaboration
As noted in Section 2.2, in the case of Article 44, there does not exist “subse-
quent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation”.80 While there does not yet 
exist consistent and explicit practice on collaboration that meets this high 
threshold, there is evidence of how collaboration under Article 44 of the ihr 
could be achieved. During the consensus conference deliberations, the schol-
ars agreed to refer to this practice as “state action”. The following provides a 
non-exhaustive elaboration of how Article 44 provides flexibility for different 
states parties and who to fulfill their obligations of collaboration. While they 
are not authoritative under the Vienna Convention, they provide helpful ex-
amples of actual instances of practice that can also be seen as a form of imple-
mentation of Article 44 obligations.
4.1 State Action
4.1.1 Article 44.1(a): Detection and assessment of, and response to, 
events
First, certain states parties may be better placed to collaborate in the “detec-
tion and assessment of, and response to, events”.81 For example, by the very 
nature of a virus originating in a specific geographic area, sharing samples of 
viruses that have the potential to instigate a pheic may only be possible for 
states in which the virus is uniquely available. Sharing virus samples with other 
countries is an interesting example of collaboration because it is applicable 
to all countries, no matter their economic status. It is a valuable form of col-
laboration because it allows the world to use its collective resources to create 
possible vaccines or medical devices that will protect the world against the 
80 Vienna Convention , above n 21, art 31.3(b).
81 ihr ,above n 1, art 44.1(a).
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 particular strain of the virus and could be vital in preventing the spread of a 
disease. Sample sharing for influenza is subject to the Pandemic Influenza Pre-
paredness Framework (pip Framework), a normative framework that aims to 
create a balance between maintaining strong global influenza surveillance and 
response systems while also ensuring equitable access to resulting benefits.82 
The kind of virus sample sharing anticipated in the pip Framework for pan-
demic influenza could additionally be undertaken as part of the ihr’s Article 
44 collaboration obligations for other diseases.
4.1.2 Article 44.1(b): Technical cooperation and logistical support
Other states parties may be particularly equipped to collaborate in certain as-
pects of responding to events or in providing logistical support in the event 
of a pheic.83 Uganda’s actions during the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa exemplify how a country can provide logistical collaboration to other 
countries during an outbreak. Uganda is a low-income country that, through 
its own experiences with Ebola between 2000 and 2012, developed logisti-
cal capacities for health workers to respond to the disease.84 Uganda sent its 
trained health workers to Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone in 2014 
to support “clinical management, coordination, surveillance, laboratory and 
social mobilization components of the response”.85 Uganda had access to 
capacities that other countries in the area, whether low-, middle- or high- 
income, did not possess, and was able to share these capacities during a critical 
time.
Canada also provided logistical support in responding to the Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa. In 2014, Canada donated 800 vials of an experimental Ebola vac-
cine its scientists had developed to who so that the vaccine could be made 
available as an international resource.86 Further, Canada provided personal 
protective equipment, which included 500,000 N95 respirators, 1,500,000 ex-
amination gloves, 3,500 surgical gloves, 50 hooded coverall suits, 2,100,000 face 
82 who, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for Sharing of Influen-
za viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, (2011) <https://www.who 
.int/influenza/pip/PIP_FQA_Nov_2011.pdf>.
83 ihr above, n 1, art 44.1(b).




86 Government of Canada, Fact Sheet – VSV-EBOV – Canada’s vaccine for Ebola 
(2018) <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/infectious-diseases/fact-sheet 
-ebov-canada-s-experimental-vaccine-ebola.html>.
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shields, and 1,250,000 isolation gowns.87 A mobile lab was also sent to Sierra 
Leone for rapid testing.88 Uganda and Canada’s experiences demonstrate that 
collaboration in responding to events can manifest itself in different forms and 
that logistical cooperation, as required under Article 44.1(b), could be expect-
ed from all states parties depending on their specific expertise, resources, and 
circumstances.
4.1.3 Article 44.1(c): Mobilization of financial resources
Financial support is also required to implement obligations under the ihr. In 
addition to Article 44.1(c) specifically dictating that collaboration is required 
to mobilize financial resources, many aspects of the provision of technical co-
operation, logistical support, and administrative or legal support, will also re-
quire collaboration around financial resources.
The response of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) 
during the 2014 Ebola outbreak provides an example of “state action” around 
the mobilization of financial resources. In the midst of the outbreak, ecowas 
created a “Solidarity Fund” to pool together resources to enable prompt re-
sponse to public health emergencies including Ebola.89 Financial contributors 
included Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Nigeria and Togo, for a total 
of usd 5,684,409.90
4.1.4 Article 44.1(d): Formulation of proposed laws and other legal/
administrative provisions
The fourth area for collaboration is legal and administrative reform.91 As na-
tional legislation and regulations are important for institutionalizing and 
strengthening the role of the ihr, states parties have an opportunity to col-
laborate with others to reach these goals. Through the Global Health Security 
Agenda (ghsa), a partnership of states that uses a multilateral and multi- 
sectoral approach to help build countries’ capacity to prevent, detect, and re-
spond to threats from infectious diseases,92 the Joint External Evaluation ( jee) 
87 Government of Canada, Canada’s response to the Ebola outbreak in the 
West Africa region (2014) <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/09/cana 
da-response-ebola-outbreak-west-africa-region.html>.
88 Ibid.
89 Economic Community of West African States (ecowas), The Ebola: The fight 
against epidemic of the Ebola virus disease within ecowas <‘">https://www.ecowas.int/
ebola/#_Toc411933801>.
90 Ibid; Nigeria: lower middle income; Cote d’Ivoire: lower middle income; Benin: low in-
come; Niger: low income; Cape Verde: lower middle (gave the least); Togo: low income.
91 ihr, above n 1, art 44.1(d).
92 Global Health Security Agenda, About the ghsa <https://www.ghsagenda.org/about>.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2021 04:35:27PM
via free access
 27Clarifying IHR Article 44 | 10.1163/15723747-2020024
<UN>
international organizations law review (2020) 1-30
was created and adopted by who to monitor and evaluate the country’s ca-
pacities under the ihr. The jee specifically provides an evaluation framework 
for, among others, a states party’s “legal framework to support and enable the 
implementation of all of their obligations and rights to comply with and im-
plement the ihr (2005)”.93 The jee target for legislation also evaluates wheth-
er state parties have “adequate funding for ihr implementation through na-
tional budget or other mechanisms.94 For example, Zimbabwe’s 2018 jee 
report identifies the need for the country to conduct “a comprehensive assess-
ment of legislation, regulations, administrative requirements, and other gov-
ernmental instruments, to determine if they facilitate full implementation of 
the ihr (2005)”.95 Through the information provided by jees, states parties 
with certain experiences or regional similarities can collaborate with other 
countries in strengthening their national legal and regulatory framework for 
integrating the ihr.
4.2 who action
who also undertakes action that could constitute collaboration for the pur-
poses of Article 44. As part of who’s mainstreaming functions, and with a goal 
of honing best practices and collaborating towards the implementation of the 
ihr, who established the Strategic Partnership for International Health Regu-
lations and Health Security (sph), a hub that brings together states parties, 
partners and donors to share information.96 As part of this program, who has 
created an online partner-matching system to “enable countries, partners and 
donors to efficiently and rapidly match needs and gaps with resources and pri-
orities to effectively improve health security”.97 Donors or partners can deter-
mine which ihr area, region, and country they wish to support and, through 
the website, contact the who Country Office to engage in collaboration. Simi-
larly, states parties in need of support can indicate the ihr areas in which they 
require support and, through the website, can contact donors who are inter-
ested in funding those areas.98 Assuming it works, this system would allow 




96 World Health Organization, Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations 
(2005) and Health Security (sph) Strategic Partnership Networks <https://extranet.who 
.int/sph/networks>.
97 World Health Organization, Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations 
(2005) and Health Security (sph) Partner Marching <https://extranet.who.int/sph/
partner-matching>.
98 Ibid.
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who to use its stewardship function to facilitate collaboration among states 
parties on different areas of ihr implementation.
who and its regional offices’ response during the Zika epidemic in Latin 
America in 2016 provide further insight into how collaboration with states par-
ties during a disease outbreak can occur, particularly through the flow of infor-
mation and the provision of technical support. For example, who launched a 
global Strategic Response Framework and Joint Operations Plan, which fo-
cused on mobilizing and coordinating states to collaborate with countries in 
surveillance, response, and research on the Zika virus.99 To ensure the sharing 
of information, who also established an online Emergency 4Ws Portal that 
recorded which states were doing “what, where, and when, at the global, re-
gional, and national level”.100 The who online portal also compiled public in-
formation materials about the Zika virus and its potential complications, in-
cluding videos, Q&A’s, factsheets, infographics and timelines, which intended 
to provide health workers, researchers, policymakers, and the public with ac-
cess to information about the disease.101
who also provided technical support during the Zika outbreak by publish-
ing a weekly situation report to provide the latest epidemiological data to the 
public, as well as translations for 16 expert guidance documents on relevant 
topics ranging from psychosocial support for mothers, to surveillance guid-
ance for entomologists. In addition, who developed Zika applications for 
smartphones to keep health workers and the public connected to the latest 
guidance and developments.102 Beyond who headquarters in Geneva, its re-
gional office for the Americas – the Pan American Health Organization – was 
highly active in supporting states to bring the epidemic under control.
5 Conclusion
Consistent throughout all versions of the ihr is the recognition that infectious 
diseases require international cooperation to prevent their spread across bor-
ders. This imposes both individual duties on states parties and mutual and 
shared obligations within the international community. Article 44 is one tool 
99 World Health Organization, Zika Virus Outbreak Global Response (2016) 4 
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found within the revised ihr that provides insight into how the world can en-
gage in effective disease control for current and future outbreaks.
The legal interpretation of Article 44’s obligations presented in this consen-
sus statement was based on the ordinary meaning of the article’s text within 
the context, in light of the object and purpose of the ihr, and supported by 
supplementary means. Most importantly, this analysis shows that there is a 
common and shared responsibility among states parties to make it possible for 
every country to achieve the minimum core public health capacities identified 
in the ihr. While Article 44 does not specify how countries must implement 
their individual obligations pursuant to this common and shared responsibil-
ity, the ihr legally requires countries to determine their level and type of col-
laboration in good faith considering the ihr’s object and purpose, differing 
abilities among countries, and who’s important role in this area.
This conclusion reveals gaps in the text of the ihr, particularly with regard 
to Article 44. Although there are clear obligations under Article 44, it is not 
possible to individually determine the exact level and type of collaboration 
required from each state party and who using the Vienna Convention’s general 
and supplementary rules of interpretation. Given the importance of collabora-
tion for achieving obligations required by the ihr, the inability to precisely 
interpret how Article 44 duties should be implemented by each country is 
problematic because it significantly raises the likelihood that states parties will 
not fulfill their legal obligations. This consensus, however, presents an oppor-
tunity for action. Article 44 should be further examined to either formally 
 revise it or to negotiate a subsequent agreement regarding its interpretation – 
the latter of which could be implemented through a resolution of the World 
Health Assembly. Short of re-negotiation the ihr or adopting supplementary 
international instruments, who with partners, could offer detailed guidance 
on how states parties could fulfill their duties. It could similarly implement 
transparent monitoring and accountability mechanisms. The who’s Joint Ex-
ternal Evaluation (jee) is a prime example of a measure implementing the 
ihr. It could consider other compliance enhancing incentives.
Additional research on different possible approaches for how countries can 
implement their individual obligations pursuant to Article 44’s common and 
shared responsibility would be especially helpful, along with further analyses 
of how the ihr can be strengthened more broadly to ensure that its object and 
purpose can be more fully realized. In the meantime, we hope this consensus 
statement provides an authoritative legal interpretation of the ihr’s Article 44 
that countries can depend upon when implementing their existing collabora-
tion obligations that should, in turn, enable enhanced global preparations for 
and responses to ongoing and future inevitable pandemics.
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